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Abstract
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with re-
spect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2-
strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized
notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s
theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with
compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasicon-
cave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for
more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria.
1. Introduction
A game in normal form is symmetric if all agents have
the same strategy set, and the payoff to playing a given strat-
egy depends only on the strategies being played, not on who
plays them. (We provide a formal definition in the next sec-
tion.) Many well-known games are symmetric, for exam-
ple the ubiquitous Prisoners’ Dilemma, as well as standard
game-theoretic auction models. Symmetric games may nat-
urally arise from models of automated-agent interactions,
since in these environments the agents may possess identi-
cal circumstances, capabilities, and perspectives, by design.
Even when actual circumstances, etc., may differ, it is of-
ten accurate to model these as drawn from identical proba-
bility distributions. Designers often impose symmetry in ar-
tificial environments constructed to test research ideas—for
example, the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) (Wellman
et al., 2001) market games—since an objective of the model
structure is to facilitate interagent comparisons.
The relevance of symmetry in games stems in large
part from the opportunity to exploit this property for com-
putational advantage. Symmetry immediately supports
more compact representation, and may often enable ana-
lytic methods specific to this structure, or algorithmic short-
cuts leading to significantly more effective or efficient so-
lution procedures. Such techniques, however, may presume
or impose constraints on solutions, for example by limit-
ing consideration to pure or symmetric equilibria. Our own
studies have often focused on symmetric games, and our at-
tempts to exploit this property naturally raise the question
of whether the symmetry-specialized techniques exces-
sively restrict the search for solutions.
Given a symmetric environment, we may well prefer
to identify symmetric equilibria, as asymmetric behavior
seems relatively unintuitive (Kreps, 1990), and difficult to
explain in a one-shot interaction. Rosenschein and Zlotkin
(1994) argue that symmetric equilibria may be especially
desirable for automated agents, since programmers can then
publish and disseminate strategies for copying, without
need for secrecy.
Despite the common use of symmetric constructions in
game-theoretic analyses, the literature has not extensively
investigated the general properties of symmetric games.
One noteworthy exception is Nash’s original paper on equi-
libria in non-cooperative games (Nash, 1951), which (in ad-
dition to presenting the seminal equilibrium existence re-
sult) considers a general concept of symmetric strategy pro-
files and its implication for symmetry of equilibria.
In the next section, we present three results on existence
of equilibria in symmetric games. The first two identify spe-
cial cases of symmetric games that possess pure-strategy
equilibria. The third—derived directly from Nash’s origi-
nal result—establishes that any finite symmetric game has a
(generally mixed) symmetric equilibrium. The remainder of
the paper considers how the general existence of symmet-
ric equilibria can be exploited by search methods that inher-
ently focus on such solutions.
2. Existence Theorems for Symmetric Games
We first give a definition of a general normal-form game,
adapted from Definition 7.D.2 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995),
followed by the definition of a symmetric game.
Definition 1 For a game with I players, the normal-form
representation specifies for each player i a set of strategies
Si (with si ∈ Si) and a payoff function ui(s1, . . . , sI) giv-
ing the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for the outcome
arising from strategies (s1, . . . , sI). We denote a game by
the tuple [I, {Si}, {ui()}].
Definition 2 (Symmetric Game) A normal-form game is
symmetric if the players have identical strategy spaces
(S1 = S2 = . . . = SI = S) and ui(si, s−i) = uj(sj , s−j),
for si = sj and s−i = s−j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I}. (s−i
denotes all the strategies in profile s except for si.) Thus we
can write u(t, s) for the utility to any player playing strat-
egy t in profile s. We denote a symmetric game by the tuple
[I, S, u()].
Finally, we refer to a strategy profile with all players
playing the same strategy as a symmetric profile, or, if such
a profile is a Nash equilibrium, a symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 1 A symmetric game with two strategies has an
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Let S = {1, 2} and let [i, I − i] denote the profile
with i ∈ {0, . . . , I} players playing strategy 1 and I − i
playing strategy 2. Let uis ≡ u(s, [i, I − i]) be the payoff to
a player playing strategy s ∈ S in the profile [i, I − i]. De-
fine the boolean function eq(i) as follows:
eq(i) ≡


u02 ≥ u
1
1 if i = 0
uI1 ≥ u
I−1
2 if i = I
ui1 ≥ u
i−1
2 & ui2 ≥ u
i+1
1 if i ∈ {1 . . . I − 1}.
In words, eq(i) = TRUE when no unilateral deviation from
[i, I− i] is beneficial—i.e., when [i, I− i] is a pure-strategy
equilibrium.
Assuming the opposite of what we want to prove,
eq(i) = FALSE for all i ∈ {0, . . . , I}. We first show by in-
duction on i that ui2 < ui+11 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , I − 1}. The
base case, i = 0, follows directly from eq(0) = FALSE.
For the general case, suppose uk2 < u
k+1
1 for some
k ∈ {0, . . . , I − 2}. Since eq(k + 1) = FALSE, we have
uk+11 < u
k
2 or u
k+1
2 < u
k+2
1 . The first disjunct contra-
dicts the inductive hypothesis, implying uk+12 < u
k+2
1 ,
which concludes the inductive proof. In particular,
uI−12 < u
I
1. But, eq(I) = FALSE implies uI1 < uI−12 , and
we have a contradiction. Therefore eq(i) = TRUE for some
i. 
Can we relax the sufficient conditions of Theorem 1?
First, consider symmetric games with more than two strate-
gies. Rock-Paper-Scissors (Table 1a) is a counterexample
showing that the theorem no longer holds. It is a three-
strategy symmetric game with no pure-strategy equilibrium.
This is the case because, of the six pure-strategy profiles
(RR, RP, RS, PP, PS, SS), none constitute an equilibrium.
Next, does the theorem apply to asymmetric two-strategy
games? Again, no, as demonstrated by Matching Pennies
(Table 1b). In Matching Pennies, both players simultane-
ously choose an action—heads or tails—and player 1 wins
if the actions match and player 2 wins otherwise. Again,
none of the pure-strategy profiles (HH,TT,HT,TH) consti-
tute an equilibrium.
Finally, can we strengthen the conclusion of Theorem 1
to guarantee symmetric pure-strategy equilibria? A simple
anti-coordination game (Table 1c) serves as a counterexam-
ple. In this game, each player receives 1 when the players
choose different actions and 0 otherwise. The only pure-
strategy equilibria are the profiles where the players choose
different actions, i.e., asymmetric profiles.
We next consider other sufficient conditions for pure
and/or symmetric equilibria in symmetric games. First we
present a lemma establishing properties of the mapping
from profiles to best responses. The result is analogous to
Lemma 8.AA.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), adapted to the
case of symmetric games.
Lemma 2 In a symmetric game [I, S, u()] with S
nonempty, compact, and convex and with u(si, s1, . . . , sI)
continuous in (s1, . . . , sI) and quasi-concave in si, the
best response correspondence
b(s) ≡ argmax
t∈S
u(t, s)
= {τ : u(τ, s) = max
t∈S
u(t, s)}
is nonempty, convex-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Since u(S, s) is the continous image of the com-
pact set S, it is compact and has a maximum and so b(s)
is nonempty. b(S) is convex because the set of maxima
of a quasiconcave function (u(·, s)) on a convex set (S) is
convex. To show that b(·) is upper hemicontinuous, show
that for any sequence sn → s such that sn ∈ b(sn) for
all n, we have s ∈ b(s). To see this, note that for all n,
u(sni , s
n) ≥ u(s′i, s
n) for all s′i ∈ S. So by continuity of
u(·), we have u(si, s) ≥ u(s′i, s). 
We now show our second main result, that infinite sym-
metric games with certain properties have symmetric equi-
libria in pure strategies. This result corresponds to Proposi-
tion 8.D.3 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) which establishes the
existence of (possibly asymmetric) pure strategy equilibria
for the corresponding class of possibly asymmetric games.
Theorem 3 A symmetric game [I, S, u()] with S a
nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean
space and u(si, s1, . . . , sI) continuous in (s1, . . . , sI) and
quasiconcave in si has a symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
rium.
Proof. b(·) is a correspondence from the nonempty, convex,
compact set S to itself. By Lemma 2, b(·) is a nonempty,
R P S
R 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
P 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
S -1,1 1,-1 0,0
H T
H 1,0 0,1
T 0,1 1,0
A B
A 0,0 1,1
B 1,1 0,0
(a) (b) (c)
Table 1. (a) Rock-Paper-Scissors: a 3-player symmetric game with no pure-strategy equilibria. (b)
Matching Pennies: a 2-player asymmetric game with no pure-strategy equilibria. (c) Anti-coordination
Game: a symmetric game with no symmetric pure equilibria.
convex-valued, and upper hemicontinous correspondence.
Thus, by Kakutani’s Theorem1, there exists a fixed point
of b(·) which implies that there exists an s ∈ S such that
s ∈ b(s) and so all playing s is a symmetric equilibrium. 
Finally, we present Nash’s (1951) result that finite sym-
metric games have symmetric equilibria.2 This is a special
case of his result that every finite game has a “symmetric”
equilibrium, where Nash’s definition of a symmetric pro-
file is one invariant under every automorphism of the game.
This turns out to be equivalent to defining a symmetric pro-
file as one in which all the symmetric players (if any) are
playing the same mixed strategy. In the case of a symmetric
game, the two notions of a symmetric profile (invariant un-
der automorphisms vs. simply homogeneous) coincide and
we have our result.
Here we present an alternate proof of the result, mod-
eled on Nash’s seminal proof of the existence of (possibly
asymmetric) equilibria for general finite games.
Theorem 4 A finite symmetric game has a symmet-
ric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. For each pure strategy s ∈ S, define a continuous
function of a mixed strategy σ by
gs(σ) ≡ max(0, u(s, σ)− u(σ, σ)).
In words, gs(σ) is the gain, if any, of unilaterally deviating
from the symmetric mixed profile of all playing σ to play-
ing pure strategy s. Next define
ys(σ) ≡
σs + gs(σ)
1 +
∑
t∈S gt(σ)
.
The set of functions ys(·)∀s ∈ S defines a mapping from
the set of mixed strategies to itself. We first show that the
1 For this and other fixed point theorems (namely Brouwer’s, used in
Theorem 4) see, for example, the mathematical appendix (p952) of
Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
2 This result can also be proved as a corollary to Theorem 3 by view-
ing a finite game as an infinite game with strategy sets being possible
mixtures of pure strategies.
fixed points of y(·) are equilibria. Of all the pure strategies
in the support of σ, one, say w, must be worst, implying
u(w, σ) ≤ u(σ, σ) which implies that gw(σ) = 0.
Assume y(σ) = σ. Then y must not decrease σw. The
numerator is σw so the denominator must be 1, which im-
plies that for all s ∈ S, gs(σ) = 0 and so all playing σ is an
equilibrium.
Conversely, if all playing σ is an equilibrium then all the
g’s vanish, making σ a fixed point under y(·).
Finally, since y(·) is a continuous mapping of a compact,
convex set, it has a fixed point by Brouwer’s Theorem. 
3. Computation of Symmetric Equilibria in
Symmetric Games
Having affirmed the existence of symmetric equilibria in
symmetric games, we consider next the computational im-
plications for game solving. The methods considered here
apply to finding one or a set of Nash equilibria (not all equi-
libria or equilibria satifying given properties).
3.1. Existing Game Solvers and Symmetry
A symmetric N -player game with S strategies has(
N+S−1
N
)
different profiles. Without exploiting symme-
try, the payoff matrix requires SN cells. This entails a huge
computational cost just to store the payoff matrix. For ex-
ample, for a 5-player game with 21 strategies, the payoff
matrix needs over four million cells compared with 53 thou-
sand when symmetry is exploited.
GAMBIT (McKelvey et al., 1992), the state-of-the-art
tool for solving finite games, employs various algorithms
(McKelvey and McLennan, 1996), none of which exploit
symmetry. In our experience (Reeves et al., to appear;
MacKie-Mason et al., 2004; Wellman et al., 2004), this ren-
ders GAMBIT unusable on many games of interest for which
methods that do exploit symmetry yield results. We discuss
two such methods in the next section.
3.2. Solving Games by Function Minimization
One of the many characterizations (McKelvey and
McLennan, 1996) of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is as
a global minimum of the following function from mixed
strategies to the reals:
f(p) =
∑
s∈S
max[0, u(s, p)− u(p, p)]2,
where u(x, p) is the payoff from playing strategy x against
everyone else playing strategy p. The function f is bounded
below by zero and in fact for any equilibrium p, f(p) is
zero. This is because f(p) is positive iff any pure strategy is
a strictly better response than p itself.
This means that we can search for symmetric equilib-
ria in symmetric games using any available function min-
imization technique. In particular, we can search for the
root of f using the Amoeba algorithm (Press et al., 1992),
a procedure for nonlinear function minimization based on
the Nelder-Mead method (Nelder and Mead, 1965). In our
previous work (Reeves et al., to appear) we have used an
adaptation of Amoeba developed by Walsh et al. (2002) for
finding symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in symmetric
games.
3.3. Solving Games by Replicator Dynamics
In his original exposition of the concept, Nash (1950)
suggested an evolutionary interpretation of the Nash equi-
librium. That idea can be codified as an algorithm for find-
ing equilibria by employing the replicator dynamics formal-
ism, introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Schuster
and Sigmund (1983). Replicator dynamics refers to a pro-
cess by which a population of strategies—where popula-
tion proportions of the pure strategies correspond to mixed
strategies—evolves over generations3 by iteratively adjust-
ing strategy populations according to performance with re-
spect to the current mixture of strategies in the population.
When this process reaches a fixed point, every pure strat-
egy that hasn’t died out is performing equally well given the
current strategy mixture. Hence the final strategy mix in the
population corresponds (under certain conditions (Reeves
et al., to appear)) to a symmetric mixed strategy equilib-
rium. Although a more general form of replicator dynam-
ics can be applied to asymmetric games (Gintis, 2000), it is
particularly suited to searching for symmetric equilibria in
symmetric games.
To implement this approach, we choose an initial pop-
ulation proportion for each pure strategy and then update
3 Instead of using discrete generations, the process can be defined con-
tinuously by a system of differential equations.
them in successive generations so that strategies that per-
form well increase in the population at the expense of low-
performing strategies. The proportion pg(s) of the popula-
tion playing strategy s in generation g is given by
pg(s) ∝ pg−1(s) · (EPs −W ),
whereEPs is the expected payoff for pure strategy s against
N − 1 players all playing the mixed strategy correspond-
ing to the population proportions, and W is a lower bound
on payoffs (e.g., the minimum value in the payoff matrix)
which serves as a dampening factor. To calculate the ex-
pected payoff EPs from the payoff matrix, we average the
payoffs for s in the profiles consisting of s concatenated
with every profile of N − 1 other agent strategies, weighted
by the probabilities of the other agents’ profiles. The proba-
bility of a particular profile (n1, ...nS) of N agents’ strate-
gies, where ns is the number of players playing strategy s,
is
N !
n1! · ... · nS !
· p(1)n1 · · · p(S)nS .
(This is the multinomial coefficient multiplied by the prob-
ability of a profile if order mattered.)
We verify directly that the population update process
has converged to a Nash equilibrium by checking that the
evolved strategy is a best response to itself.
4. Discussion
A great majority of existing solution methods for games
do not exploit symmetry. Consequently, many symmetric
games are often practically unsolvable using these methods,
while easily solvable using methods that do exploit symme-
try and restrict the solution space to symmetric equilibria.
We have presented some general results about symmetric
equilibria in symmetric games and discussed solution meth-
ods that exploit the existence result.
Since exploitation of symmetry has been known to pro-
duce dramatic simplifications of optimization problems
(Boyd, 1990) it is somewhat surprising that it has not been
actively addressed in the game theory literature. In addi-
tion to the methods we have used for game solving and
that we discuss in Section 3 (replicator dynamics and func-
tion minimization with Amoeba), we believe symme-
try may be productively exploited for other algorithms as
well. For example, the well-known Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm for 2-player (bimatrix) games lends itself to a sim-
plification if the game is symmetric and if we restrict our
attention to symmetric equilibria: we need only one pay-
off matrix, one mixed strategy vector, and one slackness
vector, reducing the size of the Linear Complementar-
ity Problem by a factor of two. As we discuss in Sec-
tion 3.1, exploiting symmetry in games with more than
two players can yield enormous computational sav-
ings.
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